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^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐHour of Choice 
  
With the Scottish independence referendum campaign in full swing, it is difficult to stand back and 
evaluate  the position of Scotland in a dispassionate way. Scottish citizens will shortly be called upon 
to  decide whether they agree or not with the proposition thaƚ ‘^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂŶ/ŶĚependent 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?A second article  W ŝŶĂƌŽƵŶĚŽŶĞŵŽŶƚŚ ?s time -  will provide an assessment of why  the 
referendum result turned out the way it did. For the moment, it behoves the serious analyst to stand 
back from the passions of the campaign itself and recall that various different perspectives and 
interpretative frameworks are available. There is no simple way of understanding why such an 
apparently simple question as independence is being asked at this particular point in history.  There 
are, however,  distinct interpretations of the Scottish referendum, some politically motivated, others 
a question of genuine ontological or epistemological enquiry. There are some areas of agreement 
amongst the Yes  supporters, as well as those of the Better Together camp. Framing Scotland in 
terms of a nation is broadly accepted; the key is whether the interest of the Scottish nation is best 
pursued in the context of a broader political and economic union with the rest of the United Kingom 
(rUK), and especially England, or via independence.  Historical symbols are used by both camps, 
especially the nationalist one. It was to be expected that the SNP (Scottish National Party)  First 
Minister, Alex Salmond ?ǁŽƵůĚƉƵďůŝĐůǇĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛvictory over England at the battle over 
Bannockburn (700 years earlier).  
 
Beyond broad historical symbols , the referendum campaign might also be interpreted in terms of a 
political game;  is this the end game of the ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌŝŶŐ for independence since the 
1960s? (DIXON 2013) Or, alternatively, it is a foolish gamble by UK premier Cameron?   Issues of 
political economy were always going to feature prominently;   what will be the future of welfare, of 
pensions, or of health? What currency will the new government use  W if, indeed, there is a new 
sovereign government? At a rather different level of analysis, the ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? debates in August 2014 
provided more of an agency focussed dimension to the campaign: the referendum campaign is also 
about individual, political and party futures.  The referendum in Scotland will also have implrtant 
ramifications elsewhere.   What would the implications of an independence vote be for the rest of 
Europe? Or, less discussed, what would the implications of a No vote be for the campaigns of 
minority nationalists elsewhere (epecially in Catalonia, which is preparing its own unofficial 
referendum on 9
th
 November).  Is the nation-state far more resilient than given credit for? All of 
these dimensions are important and will undoubtedly figure in post-referendum analysis. 
 
This article engages with these questions, but attempts something rather different.  The case of 
Scotland is framed in the context of a broader discussion of territorial political capacity, a framework 
the author has been developing over the past ten years (COLE, 2006, COLE, HARGUINDEGUY  and 
PASQUIER, 2014).   Simply put, the article argues that any typology or index which focuses narrowly 
on material indicators of territorial governance or political capacity is missing an important element 
of the story  W namely the more complex, difficult-to-measure discursive dimension centred on the 
paradigms, ideas, references or values shared by the policy-makers and citizens of a territory. 
Understanding Scotland requires grasping a mix of material and constructed realities; whether 
Scotland votes for independence or not will depend to some degree whether electors are primarily 
driven by material Wbased arguments (in which case  they will vote No), or by constructivist 
representations of identity and beliefs (in which case they will vote Yes).  
 
Our framework is comprised of seven indicators of territorial political capacity, each of which can 
have a material as well as a constructed dimension. Mainly material indicators  include:  institutions 
and institutional resources (what is the degree of self-rule?);  and economic profiles (the economic 
well-being of a region and its ranking relative to other places). Mixed material and constructed 
indicators include styles of  inter-governmental relations and multi-level governance (for example do 
regions engage with strategic Europeanisation?);  the party system  (can we identify a regionalisation 
of the party system or regional advocacy in central government?), political leadership (is there a 
form of [regional] territorial political leadership?) and, finally,  the operation of territorial regimes (is 
there a consensus between political, economic, associative actors)?  Our mainly constructed 
indicator is that of territorial identity (is the regional space underpinned by a [regional/national] 
territorial identity or not?). The approach is sufficiently generic to be used in other regions and is 
being explored in cognate surveys of Andaluciá (Spain), Brittany (France), Wales (United Kingdom) 
and Wallonia (Belgium).
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INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CAPACITY  
 
Institutional resources are the most obvious indicator of territorial political capacity. The most 
influential instrument in the past decade has been that of the Regional Authority Index (henceforth 
RAI), which disaggregates regional authority into a set of dimensions for self-rule and shared rule 
(HOOGHE ET AL. 2010, 6). Self-ƌƵůĞŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
has an independent executive, the scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax and the 
extent to which it has an independent leŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?^ŚĂƌĞĚƌƵůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽƐŚĂƉĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?ŝƐĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐĨŽƵƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ PůĂǁ-making, 
executive control, fiscal control and constitutional reform.  dŚĞŝŶĚĞǆƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ
governments ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?at a comparative disadvantage in relation to regions in federal or 
regional states. The devolved Scottish government certainly has an independent government, 
responsible to an elected parliament with a broĂĚƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽŶĂ ‘ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?
model. 
ii
 But it has limited financial or tax-varying powers, its legislative sovereignty is partial and it  
does not have all the instruments to implement its policy preferences.  
One of the core drivers behind the referendum campaign is to provide Scotland with the necessary 
levers to be able, de facto, to implement more territory-specific policies. Observers such as 
MITCHELL (2009) argue that  the welfare state  issues that really matter for the Scottish are not fully 
devolved: labour market policy,  social security, immigration, citizenship, the social dimension of the  
European Union. Moreover, the Scottish government has very limited fiscal capacity; it is in no 
position to avail itself of the legal possibility it has to vary income tax by three pence in the pound, 
and, thus far, it has no control over corporation tax.  The limited instruments of devolution do not 
imply limited visions, however.  A vision of devolution as social-democratic, socially progressive and 
economically realistic is one of the few legacies shared by pre- and post-2007 Scottish governments.  
The move for Devolution in Scotland in particular gathered pace as an anti-Thatcher, pro-welfare 
enterprise. Under Mrs Thatcher (1979-1990), in particular, Scotland was viewed as experimental 
territory, a terrain where neo-liberal policy initiatives could be tried and tested. The community 
charge (poll tax) was introduced into Scotland one year earlier than in England and Wales, for 
example. The legitimacy of Scottish devolution has been bound up with a policy discourse  W based 
on community and social solidarity - for which the instruments are only partially devolved. In these 
circumstances of partial devolution, policy divergence  W the early marking out of devolution as  
distinct from neo-liberal England  W was a political project in itself, clearly elucidated in the case of 
free home care for the elderly, health care,  no university fees for Scottish students or access to 
expensive drugs on the NHS (GREER, 2007).   
 
StroŶŐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚ ‘Ĩŝƚ ?ĞĂƐŝly into broad comparative schema. In 
terms of any formal reading, Scotland has the most advanced form of devolved powers within the 
United Kingdom. In the Scotland Act, the Scottish parliament was granted primary legislative powers 
in all areas except those reserved by Parliament for the UK government : namely everything except 
constitutional affairs, financial relations, foreign policy and defense, the European Union,  social 
security and citizenship. Though the powers granted to the Scottish parliament have been difficult to 
implement in some respects (for instance, the ability to vary the key rate of income tax by 3p in the 
£),  there has been a spillover in other fields (such as an increasingly visible Scottish stance in 
European Union policy).  The RAI arguably provides for a more accurate representation of regional 
authority in federal polities (whereby territorial influence is derived as much from the shared rule as 
from the self-rule dimensions) than it does in the UK, which  lends itself less  to system-wide 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞŚĞƌŵĞƚŝĐǁŽƌůĚŽĨĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?tŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŽĨůŽĐĂů
and devolved governments, the weakness of partisan or policy networks linking Westminster and 
the devolved governments all contribute to explaining these low rankings. It is difficult to admit, 
however, that Scotland,  with its reserved power model of legislative sovereignty, ought to have a 
lower ranking than a German Länd with a more limited and tightly constrained set of legislative 
competencies.  
 
ECONOMIC CAPACITY AND PROFILE   
As outlined in Table 1, Scotland has a GVA  (Gross value added) that is around the average of the 
h< ?ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞůůĂŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞƉoorest regions such as Wales, north-east England or northern 
Ireland.  It has a rate of public sector employment that is well above average and benefits from one 
of the highest rates of public expenditure by head.  
 














United Kingdom 21,295 100.0 1,383,082 100.0 
     
North East 16,091 75.6 41,874 3.0 
North West 18,438 86.6 130,618 9.4 
Yorkshire & The 
Humber 17,556 82.4 93,339 6.7 
East Midlands 17,448 81.9 79,698 5.8 
West Midlands 17,429 81.8 98,346 7.1 
East of England 19,658 92.3 116,125 8.4 
London 37,232 174.8 309,339 22.4 
South East 23,221 109.0 202,597 14.6 
South West 19,023 89.3 101,576 7.3 
     
England 21,937 103.0 1,173,512 84.8 
Wales 15,401 72.3 47,344 3.4 
Scotland 20,013 94.0 106,342 7.7 
Northern Ireland 16,127 75.7 29,410 2.1 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (2014) Compendium of UK Statistics 
(http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/compendiums/compendium-of-uk-statistics/index.html, 
accessed 20.06.14)  
 
 
Unlike Wales, Scotland can boast substantial economic capital, through its financial and legal  firms, 
its banks and insurance companies, its universities, as well as what remains of North Sea oil and gas. 
dŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ŚĂǀĞƚŚƵƐĨĂƌŚĂĚůŝŵŝƚĞĚĨŝƐĐĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?
however, which we define in terms of having access to a wide tax base, some freedom in setting tax 
rates and borrowing capacity; such fiscal capacity is essential if sub-national governments are to 
have access to and secure confidence in international bond markets (DYSON, 2014). How would an 
independent Scotland pay its way in the world?  This question has been at the heart of the 2014 
independence referendum campaign. The strengths of the economy are also its weaknesses: the 
dire warnings by banks such as Standard Chartered and HSBC to relocate in the event of a Yes victory 
arguably challenge the sustainability of Edinburgh as a financial capital; the warnings by oil majors 
BP and Shell, taken together with the controversy over the extent of North Sea reserves, undermine 
one of the key arguments for independence. The weight of the financial sector  W 12 times Scottish 
GDP, higher than Iceland before the crash  W would pose a risk in the event of a banking or currency 
crisis. The ratings agencies -   DŽŽĚǇ ?ƐƉĂƌĞǆĞŵƉůĞ Whave declared that an independent Scotland 
would have a lower rating than the rUK, hence higher interest rates. The main campaign issue 
related to the role of the currency in the future of an independent Scotland P^ĂůŵŽŶĚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ
that the Bank of England would agree to a currency union with Scotland, implying joint steering of 
the £, was flatly rejected by UK Chancellor Osborne, backed by the three unionist parties in Scotland 
(Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives). The lack of a Plan B (what would happen if 
the BoE did not agree to share control over sterling with Scotland?)  put Salmond in great difficulty 
during the first leaders ? debate in August 2014. There was little appetite for embracing the euro, the 
single European currency, though Salmond declared the Scots to be more European than their 
southern neighbours. Finally, whether the mobilisation of the majority of the business community 
against independence would have an impact or not  was one of the key unknowns in the run-up to 
the 18
th
 September referendum.  
 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS  AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
The United Kingdom has been described as a Union State, rather than a unitary state. To this extent, 
we agree with MITCHELL (2004)  that the United Kingdom provides for a curious mix of the Union 
and Unitary State, the Union State allowing for the development of territorial asymmetry, but the 
Unitary version, underpinned by a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,  emphasising the hierarchy 
of the centre over the periphery. Whether the central government in London respects the Union 
form (allowing Scotland, Wales and northern Ireland substantial domestic autonomy) or attempts to 
impose a more thorough going Unitary vision (as under Thatcher in the 1980s) has varied somewhat 
according to historical period. The creation of devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and 
northern Ireland in 1999-2000  confirmed the nature of the UK as a Union state based on territorial 
assymetries;  Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England are subject to rather different rules 
within the context of the UK state.  
 
Such assymetry is in part historical. When England and Scotland agreed to the Act of Union in 1707, 
there was an understanding that the Scots would retain their national identity, their Presbyterian 
church, as well as their separate education and legal systems. The grand bargain also rested upon 
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚcivil society institutions. A  London strategy of central autonomy  W 
governing from London in the area of high politics, but allowing local  and regional governments 
considerable practical autonomy W was pursued  in return for a generously funded  benign neglect 
towards Scotland (arguably even before devolution) counterbalanced by an incorporation of Scottish 
elites into the heart of the British state. One of the driving forces behind the rising demand for 
devolution in the late 1990s was the breach of this unwritten convention by central government. 
The Thatcher government (1979-1990) spurned the social consensus upon which the  ‘dual polity ? 
had rested and sought to construct a Britishness based on commitment to neo-liberal economic 
modernisation. There was a territorial dimension to this, as southern England appeared to be 
furthering its interests over the rest of the union. Even before Thatcher, Scots had begun decisively 
to reject the notion of Britishness from the early 1970s onwards.  
 
The early years of devolution in Scotland were marked by the dynamic of limited divergence, as the 
new political institutions were determined to leave their trace, especially in social and welfare 
policy. In core areas of interdependence (notably the European Union, but also some aspects of 
welfare policy), intergovernmental relations were to be managed by the doctrine of No Surprises 
(whereby London and the devolved governments would inform each other of their actions and avoid 
embarrassing the other); this position was facilitated by de facto party political congruence from 
1997-2007, as the Labour party controlled the executives in Edinburgh, London and Cardiff. Party 
congruence also facilitated an informal mode of inter-governmental relations, one marked by  
pragmatic accommodation, personal contacts  and a common civil service (PARRY, 2004; MCEWEN, 
2012). From 2007, the pattern of party political congruence ended with a bang, as the SNP was 
elected at the head of a minority government in Scotland (and re-elected with an overall majority in 
2011). The formation of the Coalition government in the UK in 2010 began a new phase, with 
ƉƌĞŵŝĞƌĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ, whereby London would not interfere with policy choices made 
in the devolved nations in return for the latter engaging in the efforts at economic and budgetary 
tightening. This strategy was consistent with a longer-term strategy of central autonomy (from 
>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚ onwards, the move towards a referendum developed 
momentum both in Edinburgh and in London. The agreement between Cameron and Salmond: 
designed either to keep Scotland within the union for the next generation, or to improve the 
chances of the Conservative Party to exercise a permanent control over government in the rUK. 
 
Using a referendum to settle a constitutional issue is consistent with recent British history, from the 
1973 referendum on the Common Market onwards (inter alia,  the 1979 and 1997-98 referendums 
on devolution or the 2010 referendum on electoral reform). In and of itself, however, this testifies to 
the extreme weakness of mechanisms of intergovernmental coordination that will need to be 
revisited if Scotland votes No.  
 
The question of Europe figured prominently in the campaign, but not in terms of the traditional 
euro-enthusiasm versus euro-scepticism. Certainly, the YES camp claimed to be more European than 
the neo-liberal English (though they markedly refused to countenance adopting the Euro as the 
future Scottish currency). The campaign was marked by a rather arcane  W but extremely important  W 
legal dispute concerning the role of an independent Scotland in the European Union. Would 
Scotland have the status of a continuing state, as part of the UK and signatory to all of the treaties?  
In this case, the newly independent Scotland would retain the various opt-outs negotiated by the UK 
government and would be a full member of the EU. Or, in the terms of international law, would 
Scotland be the successor state? In the latter case, she would have to apply to join the European 
Union from afresh, along with other international organisations such as NATO and the UN. The 
debate was not settled during the campaign itself, but there were indications of hostility to allowing 
the new state automatic entry.  The President of the European Commission Barroso, in 2013, implied 
that Scotland would have to reapply for membership and join the queue behind applicant members 
such as Serbia and Turkey. Key veto players, such as Spanish premier Rajoy, indicated that they 
would veto Scottish entry to the EU, determined to prevent similar moves from taking place in their 
own autonomist-minded regions, and particularly Catalonia. 
 
THE PARTY SYSTEM   
 One dimension of (regional) territorial capacity lies in the party system. We identify two distinct 
configurations of regionalisation. First, the emergence of territory-specific (ethno-territorial) parties 
as the key parties in regional elections. The politics of ethno-territorial mobilization reflects itself in 
sub-state political institutions, distinctive party systems, language rights movements and cultural 
traditions(DE WINTER and TURSAN, 1998; MORENO,2007). There is a growing literature on the 
impact of ƐƉůŝƚǀŽƚŝŶŐŝŶ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?:KE^ĂŶĚ^h>>z ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?
demonstrate the differential between voting for minority nationalist parties (Plaid Cymru, SNP) in 
devolved and UK-wide elections, the regionalists performing much better in the territory specific 
elections than at the UK-level where the traditionally unionist Labour Party continues to dominate. 
The SNP  has ruled  the devolved Scottish government since 2007 , while Labour continues to  
dominate  traditional Westminster (UK) elections. Many Scottish electors support the SNP in 
devolved elections,  because it has provided for a stout defense of Scottish interests: the 
referendum of September 18
th
 will tell us whether they also favour independence.  Whatever the 
outcome, the pressure exercised by a resurgent nationalism  on the main unionist partes since the 
1970s (in Scotland and Wales, at least) is one of the core dynamics in British party politics.  
 
A  rather different indicator identifies the weight of regional/nationalist lobbies within the national 
parties or national parliamentary institutions (in order to defend a territorial interest at the higher 
level). The case is well illustrated in the case of Spain, where the leading party in the lower chamber 
must often negotiate with pivotal parties (in general Basque, Catalan, Galician and Canary Island 
nationalist parties) whose votes are required to help it to pass government bills (ORTE and WILSON, 
2009).   At pivotal stages in the past, in the 1970s notably, the SNP and Plaid Cymru performed a 
similar pivotal role. But  the SNP is mainly signficant as a political entrepreneur, a highly professional 
and tightly organised outfit which has demonstrated its capacity to govern Scotland over a sustained 
period. The Scottish case very clearly fits the model of split voting, as the SNP has imposed itself as 
the key national party in Scottish elections, but Labour retains this position in relation to 
Westminster. Whether this is a convenient division of labour, or an unsustainable one is one of the 
many questions that will be answered by the referendum.  
 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
 
Political leadership is traditionally a neglected  variable for understanding territorial dynamics. 
Rather like supranational or national forms, studying territorial political leadership logically involves 
three main levels of analysis: the individual, the positional and the environmental (COLE, 2012; 
LAGROYE, 1997).  The individual level can refer to the mobilising qualities of particular individuals. 
Media attention usually focuses on Livingstone or Johnson as successive mayors of London or 
powerful mayors of French cities such as Collomb in Lyons, or Delanöe in France. Individuals also 
occupy specific positions; their leadership styles will reflect in some measure the combination of 
individual preferences,  the role opportunities presented by specific positions or offices and their 
strategic skills  in blending the two.  
 
There is evidence since the 1980s of new forms of territorial leadership, based on transformational, 
if not to say confrontational styles: with Jordi Pujol in Catalonia, Bart de Weaver in Flanders and Alec 
Salmond in Scotland providing three very different exemplars. In the case of Spanish autonomous 
communities, the Belgian regions or the devolved governments in the UK, devolved governments 
provide powerful institutional  platforms upon which to base highly politicized and conflictual forms 
of inter-governmental  relationships.  Alex Salmond corresponds well to the transformational leader, 
as described in BURNS (1978); goal driven, with a long term strategy to transform society, rather  
consensus building and compromise. Few contest that Salmond is bearer of a vision, though many 
contested its well-foundededness. Is there a goodness of fit between a particular leadership style 
and the opportunities provided by overarching political circumstances? It is logically impossible to 
predict what would have happened had he not been First Minister since 2007, but Salmond has 
come to exemplify  the nationalist and independence cause in a way that was not foreseen  in 




Territorial regimes provide a sixth indicator of territorial capacity. By territorial regime, we refer to 
long-established forms of co-operation between actors in well-defined policy universes.    In the case 
of Scotland, a  territorial regime  coalesced around the prospect of devolution during the 1980s,  
therefore preceding the creation of devolution. The Constitutional Convention, established in 1988, 
brought together a broad cross-section of political, economic and associative actors society to 
deliberate upon the future archiecture of devolution. Strong institutions, well enmeshed into civil 
society and supported by a cohesive policy community, have embedded  Scottish devolution. 
Though Scotland has always scored highly on this indicator, the referendum campaign is bound to 
leave scars and will possibly compromise the prospect of harmonious instititions in the future. Will  
the  divisions amongst the business and scientific communities, in particular, weaken the processes 




 Interpreting territorial governance from an identity-based perspective implies looking  to regions, or 
stateless nations  as historic, cultural and political entities and identifying territorial networks or 
ethnoterritorial parties sharing a common identity (GUIBERNAU, 1999; GAGNON, PALARD and 
GAGNON, 2006; DE WINTER and TURSAN, 1998; MORENO, 2007).  Scotland also scores very highly in 
terms of territorial identity indicators. As Table 3 demonstrates, most Scots feel Scottish rather than 
British; indeed, in the 2009 Citizenship after the Nation-State survey, Scotland had the highest sense 
ŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ ‘ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŽĨĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ formed part of the sample. Table 2  
needs no further discussion. Were this a referendum about a sense of belonging and of identity, 
then the YES camp would wins hands down. On the other hand, the bipolarisation brought to light 
by the 2014 referendum campaign can also undermine the longer term modes of cooperation and 
relationship maintenance.  
 
Table  2 


















Scotland 19 41 26 4 7 3 
Catalonia 16 29 37 6 6 6 
Wales 11 29 33 10 15 2 
Upper 
Austria 
10 16 38 11 22 3 
Bavaria 9 19 36 11 19 6 
Thuringia 9 18 44 9 17 3 
Salzburg 9 17 50 9 10 5 
Vienna 7 14 38 15 19 7 
Galicia 6 25 57 6 4 2 
Lower 
Saxony 
6 11 34 15 27 7 
Brittany 2 23 50 15 9 1 
Castille La 
Mancha 
2 4 52 18 20 4 
Alsace  1 17 42 20 15 5 
Ile de France 1 7 30 42 12 8 
 
Source: Survey carried out in April and May 2009 with a representative sample of 900 people in 
14 regions, as part of the  Citizenship after Nation State (CANS) project, funded by the European 





Using the territorial political capacity framework to present the  case of Scotland was to  intended 
allow a cool reflection of the varied dimensions of political Scottishness. It does not provide a guide 
to the eventual result of the referendum. Insofar as Scotland scores highly on the seven indicators 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?EKǀŽƚĞ
would signify the limits to the processes of territorial assymetry that  challenge the boundaries of 
existing states; without removing the underlying causes of territorial fragmentation, such a result 
would underline the robustness of existing states. A YES vote, on the other hand, might produce 
emulation from other first order strong identity regions/nations across Europe, in Catalonia and 
Flanders especially, with unpredictable consequences.  The framework referred to the material  and 
constructed dimensions of governance. While there are arguments on both sides,  the economic 
argument is central. On the eve of the referendum, the polls indicate that the YES camp has so far 
failed to provide convincing answers on a number of pressing issues of immediate daily concern: the 
future of the currency, the role of Scotland within or outside the European Union, the financing of 
the welfare state, immigration and labour mobility. On the other hand, the polls also indicate a 
narrowing of the gap between the two sides as the campaign has progressed. Were the campaign to 
be fought on narrow identity issues, the likelihood is that the YES would win. Whatever the result, 
the referendum is unlikely to close the chapter of Scottish national claims within or beyond the 
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i
 dŚĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĚĂƚĂĨŽƌŵƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ>ĞǀĞƌŚƵůŵĞdƌƵƐƚ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůEĞƚǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘dĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ PďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?(IN-2012-109). I thank the Trust for its support. I also 
thank the Collegium de Lyon for providing excellent  support throughout 2014.  
ii
  In the case of Scotland, there is a general legislative competency, except in those areas that are reserved for 
London, In Wales, on the other hand, the Assembly has legislative competency in 20  specifically enumerated 
fields.  
